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Introduction	  	  A	  lesson	  learned	  from	  the	  U.S.	  home	  mortgage	  market	  over	  the	  past	  17	  years	  is	  that	  competition	  among	  banks	  to	  provide	  mortgages	  has	  not	  worked.	  The	  reason	  is	   that	   the	  need	   for	   new	  homes	   in	   the	  U.S.	   is	   a	   finite	   one	   at	   approximately	   1.8	  million	  units	  per	  year.	  If	  house	  prices	  move	  in	  line	  with	  the	  CPI	  index,	  there	  is	  a	  finite	   need	   for	   money	   to	   fund	   the	   1.8	   million	   units.	   Individual	   banks	   have	   no	  control	   over	   competitors’	   behavior	   and	   competition	   will	   drive	   them	   to	   sell	   as	  many	  mortgages	  as	  they	  can.	  This	  was	  enhanced	  when	  the	  opportunity	  arose	  to	  sell	   off	   the	   credit	   risks	   through	  mortgage-­‐backed	   securities.	   The	   use	   of	   credit	  default	  swaps	  further	  removed	  the	  risks	  to	  third	  parties.	  What	  the	  U.S.	  economy	  needed	  was	  a	  home	  mortgage	  credit	  volume	  control	  mechanism.	  This	  did	  not	  and	  does	  not	  exist.	  The	  consequence	  was	  that	  each	  new	  home	  built	  required	  higher	  and	   higher	   amounts	   of	   money	   input,	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   rather	   than	   allocating	  $125,260	  per	  each	  new	  home	  as	  was	   the	  case	   in	  1997,	   it	  needed	  $574,550	  per	  new	  home	  in	  2006.	  The	  economic	  value	  of	  the	  output	  achieved	  with	  the	  money	  input	  had	  dropped	  considerably,	  while	  the	  indebtedness	  of	  the	  new	  mortgagees	  had	   increased	   dramatically.	   This	   is	   a	   combination	   of	   reduced	   efficiency	   of	   the	  money	   used	   plus	   a	   higher	   than	   necessary	   level	   of	   indebtedness	   for	   the	   new	  mortgagees.	  	  Both	  factors	  reduce	  economic	  growth	  levels.	  	  The	   fact	   that	   from	  1998-­‐2007	   both	   trends	  were	   allowed	   to	   continue	  was	   very	  detrimental	  to	  the	  U.S.	  economy	  as	  well	  as	  to	  those	  of	  other	  countries.	  	  The	  costs	  of	  such	  overfunding	  of	  the	  U.S.	  housing	  market	  were	  enormous.	  Over	  the	   period	   2006-­‐2013	   22.1	   million	   households	   were	   faced	   with	   foreclosure	  proceedings	   or	   1	   out	   of	   every	   6	   U.S.	   households.	   	   Over	   the	   same	   period	   5.8	  million	   homes	   were	   repossessed	   or	   1	   out	   every	   8-­‐mortgage	   holders.	   From	  January	  2008	  to	  October	  2009	  7.8	  million	  Americans	   lost	   their	   jobs.	   	  Of	  course	  the	   pressure	   on	   households	   to	   pay	   back	   the	   excessive	   loans	   was	   substantial.	  Spending	   on	   all	   other	   items	   was	   reduced,	   leading	   to	   the	   sharply	   increased	  unemployment	  levels	  as	  well	  as	  to	  the	  lengthy	  economic	  adjustment	  period.	  Over	  the	   period	   2008-­‐third	   quarter	   2014,	   the	   total	   outstanding	   mortgage	   portfolio	  was	  reduced	  by	  $1.2	   trillion.	  The	  U.S.	  government	  had	   to	  borrow	  an	  extra	  $3.5	  trillion	  just	  to	  maintain	  government	  programs.	  	  The	   aggressive	   lowering	   of	   interest	   rates	   did	   not	   entice	   more	   individual	  households	   to	   borrow	   more	   as	   the	   mortgage	   portfolio	   reduction	   testifies.	  Quantitative	   easing	   –buying	   up	   past	   government	   debt-­‐	   did	   put	   more	   liquidity	  into	   the	   financial	   markets	   and	   lowered	   long-­‐term	   interest	   rates,	   but	   did	   not	  improve	   the	   financial	   position	   of	   individual	   households.	   Using	   future	  government	   revenues	   flows	   for	   the	   benefit	   of	   individual	   households	   in	   the	  current	  period	  and	  thereby	  for	  the	  whole	  economy	  was	  not	  considered.	  	  It	  is	  with	  this	  economic	  history	  in	  mind	  that	  a	  proposal	  is	  set	  out	  for	  an	  Economic	  Growth	   Incentive	   Method	   (EGIM).	   Such	   proposal	   suggests	   using	   the	   funding	  power	  of	  a	  central	  bank,	  not	  just	  in	  the	  U.S.,	  but	  also	  in	  Europe,	  to	  help	  individual	  households	  directly.	  How	  this	  can	  all	  work	  has	  been	  set	  out	  in	  this	  paper.	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1.	  An	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  of	  the	  most	  recent	  U.S.	  financial	  and	  economic	  crisis.	  
	  
1.1 A	  savings-­‐use	  of	  savings	  hypothesis	  
	  Savings	   are	   turned	   into	   financial	   assets;	   into	   assets	   used	   in	   the	   production	  process	   and	   into	   savings	   held	   in	   homes	   and	   other	   properties.	   This	   conversion	  process	   works	   in	   two	   ways:	   the	   saver	   decides	   to	   acquire	   assets	   with	   own	  savings:	   the	   direct	   conversion	   method.	   The	   indirect	   method	   applies	   when	  savings	   are	   turned	   into	   loans	   to	   a	   government,	   companies	   and	   individual	  households.	  	  The	  indirect	  method	  uses	  cash	  supplied	  by	  some	  individual	  households	  to	  add	  to	  income	  and	  consumption	  levels	  of	  a	  government;	  to	  borrowed	  funds	  for	  working	  capital	  and	  fixed	  assets	  for	  companies	  and	  to	  additional	  cash	  for	  other	  individual	  households.	   These	   funds	   are	   mostly	   channeled	   through	   collective	   savings	  vehicles.	  They	  might	  be,	  among	  others,	  pension	  funds,	   life	  insurance	  companies	  as	  well	  as	  mutual	  funds,	  hedge	  funds	  and	  funds	  entrusted	  to	  the	  banking	  sector.	  	  The	   hypothesis	   is	   that	   debt	   funds	   provided	   to	   governments	   and	   individual	  households,	   the	   indirect	   method,	   have	   the	   capacity	   of	   accelerating	   economic	  growth	  but	  also	  of	  slowing	  it	  down.	  A	  turning	  point	  is	  reached	  when	  the	  growth	  of	   disposable	   incomes	   of	   individual	   households	   can	   no	   longer	   support	   the	  increased	  level	  of	  debt	  outstanding.	  	  	  In	  the	  next	  section	  the	  hypothesis	  will	  be	  tested	  for	  the	  United	  States.	  	  
1.2	  Empirical	  evidence	  from	  the	  U.S.	  
	  
The	  money	  input-­‐new	  housing	  starts	  output	  relationship	  
	  1997	   has	   been	   chosen	   as	   the	   base	   year	   as	   in	   this	   year	   the	   increase	   in	   the	  mortgage	  amounts	  outstanding	  was	  $180	  billion1,	   the	  new	  housing	  starts	  per	  1	  July	  of	  the	  same	  year	  on	  an	  annualized	  basis	  were	  1.437	  million2,	  the	  median	  U.S.	  house	   price	   was	   $145,900	   in	   July	   19973	  and	   the	   amount	   allocated	   to	   each	  individual	  new	  housing	  start	  was	  $125,260.	  The	   latter	  amount	  was	  determined	  by	  dividing	   the	   increase	   in	  mortgage	  amounts	  outstanding	  by	   the	  new	  housing	  starts	   in	   the	   same	   year.	   The	  median	   U.S.	   house	   price	   rose	   to	   $149,900	   in	   July	  1998	  and	  the	  amounts	  spend	  per	  new	  home	  rose	  to	  $177,270.	  1998	  was	  the	  turn	  around	  year.	  	  Table	  1	  will	  set	  out	  the	  money	  input	  into	  the	  new	  housing	  starts	  and	  the	  average	  output	  price	  of	  the	  new	  homes	  for	  the	  period	  1997-­‐2008.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/current/accessible/b100.htm	  2	  https://www.census.gov/construction/pdf/bpsa.pdf	  3	  http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/MSPNHSUS	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Table	  1:	  Money	   input	  –	  new	  housing	  output	  and	  average	  money	  allocated	  
per	  new	  home	  built	  over	  the	  period	  1997-­‐2008	  in	  the	  U.S.	  
	  Year	  	   Increase	  in	  mortgage	  amounts	  x	  	  U.S.$	  billlion	  
Housing	  starts	  per	  1	  July	  on	  annualized	  basis	  x	  million	  
U.S.$	  allocated	  	  for	  each	  new	  home	  1997	   	  	  	  180	   1.437	   125,260	  1998	   	  	  	  301	   1.698	   177,270	  1999	   	  	  	  377	   1.699	   221,900	  2000	   	  	  	  382	   1.463	   261,110	  2001	   	  	  	  509	   1.670	   304,790	  2002	   	  	  	  706	   1.655	   426,590	  2003	   	  	  	  881	   1.897	   464,420	  2004	   	  	  	  950	   2.002	   474,525	  2005	   1,053	   2.054	   512,660	  2006	   	  	  	  998	   1.737	   574,550	  2007	   	  	  	  701	   1.354	   517,730	  2008	   -­‐	  	  	  	  32	   	  	  .923	   	  	  In	  table	  2,	  in	  an	  alternative	  approach,	  the	  question	  has	  been	  answered	  how	  many	  new	  homes	  could	  have	  been	  started	  if	  U.S.	  home	  prices	  had	  increased	  in	  line	  with	  the	  Consumer	  Price	  Inflation	  Index	  (CPI).	  	  
Table	  2:	  Potential	  Housing	  starts	  based	  on	  CPI	  basis	  	  Year	  	   Increase	   in	  mortgage	  amounts	  x	  U.S.$	  billion	  
Housing	  starts	  per	   1	   July	  on	  annualized	  basis	   x	  million	  
Annual	  CPI	  Inflation	  	  %	  
Median	  house	  prices	  	  per	  1	  July	  based	  on	  CPI	  x	  U.S.$	  
Potential	   housing	  starts	  based	  	  on	  CPI	  x	  million	  
1997	   	  	  	  180	   1.437	   	   145,900	   1.437	  1998	   	  	  	  301	   1.698	   1.6	   148,234	   2.031	  1999	   	  	  	  377	   1.699	   2.2	   151,495	   2.489	  2000	   	  	  	  382	   1.463	   3.4	   156,645	   2.439	  2001	   	  	  	  509	   1.670	   2.8	   161,031	   3.161	  2002	   	  	  	  706	   1.655	   1.6	   163,607	   4.315	  2003	   	  	  	  881	   1.897	   2.3	   167,370	   5.264	  2004	   	  	  	  950	   2.002	   2.7	   171,889	   5.527	  2005	   1,053	   2.054	   3.4	   177,733	   5.925	  2006	   	  	  	  998	   1.737	   3.2	   183,420	   5.441	  2007	   	  	  	  701	   1.354	   2.9	   188,739	   3.714	  2008	   -­‐	  	  	  	  32	   	  	  .923	   3.8	   195,911	   negative	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  Table	  1	   illustrates	   that	   the	  new	  money	   input	   into	   the	  housing	  market	  does	  not	  necessarily	  stimulate	  new	  homes	  being	  built.	  Over	  the	  period	  1997-­‐2005	  money	  flows	   used	   by	   individual	   households	   to	   acquire	   homes	   show	   that	   higher	   and	  higher	   amounts	   of	  money	  were	   needed	   per	   each	   newly	   built	   home.	   Economic	  growth	  only	  occurs	  by	  building	  more	  homes	  and	  not	  by	   increasing	   the	  price	  of	  the	  total	  stock	  of	  homes	  far	  in	  excess	  of	  income	  developments.	  	  Another	  way	  of	  expressing	  the	  development	  of	  the	  inefficient	  use	  of	  money	  in	  the	  home	  mortgage	  market	  in	  the	  U.S.	  over	  the	  period	  1997-­‐2007	  is	  to	  calculate	  the	  Money	  Efficiency	   Index	  (MEI).	  This	   index	   is	  calculated	  by	  comparing	   the	  actual	  number	  of	  housing	  starts	  per	  annum	  with	  the	  potential	  number	  of	  housing	  starts.	  The	  latter	  was	  based	  on	  the	  CPI	  index	  plus	  the	  money	  input	  into	  the	  new	  housing	  starts.	  	  Table	  3	  provides	  the	  results.	  	  
Table	  3	  Money	  Efficiency	  Index	  
	  Year	  	   Money	  Efficiency	  Index	  	   Year	   Money	  Efficiency	  Index	  	  1997	   100	   2003	   36.0	  1998	   	  83.6	   2004	   36.2	  1999	   	  68.3	   2005	   34.7	  2000	   	  60.0	   2006	   31.9	  2001	   	  52.8	   2007	   36.5	  2002	   	  38.4	   	   	  
	  	  To	  understand	  the	   importance	  of	   this	  conclusion,	  one	  has	   to	  check	  the	  motives	  behind	   the	  borrowings.	   Population	   growth,	   changes	   in	   average	   family	   size	   and	  changing	   age	   patterns	   lead	   to	   a	   finite	   demand	   for	   new	   housing	   starts.	   Such	  demand	   is	   not	   based	   on	   supply	   levels,	   but	   on	   the	   need	   for	   shelter.	   When	  mortgages	  are	  on	  offer	  the	  restraining	  factor	  for	  an	  individual	  household	  is	  not	  the	   supply	   of	   homes,	   but	   the	   income	   level	   needed	   to	   support	   the	   loan	   facility.	  Individual	   households	   do	   not	   operate	   like	   companies;	   they	   do	   not	   seek	   to	  maximize	  profits	  as	  a	  home	  is	  for	  personal	  use.	  If	  capital	  gains	  are	  made,	  they	  are	  illusionary	  until	   the	  moment	  of	  sale.	  Rapid	  price	  rises	  for	  homes	  do	  undermine	  the	  efforts	  of	  the	  young	  to	  get	  on	  the	  property	  ladder.	  	  In	  the	  U.S.	  the	  42%	  gain	  in	  the	  number	  of	  new	  housing	  starts	  from	  1997	  to	  2005	  was	   totally	   offset	   by	   the	   409%	   increase	   in	   the	   new	  money	   allocated	   per	   new	  home	   build.	   There	   has	   been	   an	   extremely	   low	   correlation	   between	   one	   extra	  dollar	   in	   home	   loans	   –the	   money	   input-­‐	   and	   the	   new	   housing	   starts	   –the	  economic	  output-­‐.	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  Table	   2	   illustrates	   the	   same	   fact	   in	   a	   different	  manner.	   If	   house	   prices	   would	  have	  developed	  in	  line	  with	  the	  CPI	  inflation	  levels,	  the	  money	  allocated	  to	  new	  home	  starts	  would	  have	  made	  it	  possible	  to	  increase	  the	  level	  from	  1.437	  million	  in	  1997	  to	  5.925	  million	  in	  2005.	  The	  U.S.	  did	  not	  need	  nearly	  6	  million	  homes	  to	  being	  built	  in	  2005.	  Around	  1.8	  million	  would	  have	  been	  fully	  satisfactory.	  What	  is	   relevant	   in	   this	   context	   is	   that	   individual	   households’	   income	   levels	   move	  much	  closer	  in	  line	  with	  the	  CPI	  levels	  than	  with	  the	  House	  Price	  Index.	  	  Over	  the	  period	  1997-­‐2005	  each	  new	  dollar	  borrowed	  for	  a	  home	  mortgage	  has	  had	   a	   rapidly	   declining	   impact	   on	   economic	   output	   and	   thereby	   economic	  growth.	  Table	  3	  illustrates	  the	  Money	  Efficiency	  Index,	  which	  clearly	  shows	  the	  increasingly	  inefficient	  use	  of	  money	  between	  1998	  and	  2006.	  	  The	  second	  consequence	  of	  the	  increasing	  inefficient	  use	  of	  funds	  has	  been	  that	  individual	   households	   joining	   the	   housing	   ladder	   had	   to	   allocate	   a	   larger	   and	  larger	  share	  of	  their	  incomes	  in	  order	  to	  be	  able	  to	  acquire	  a	  home.	  This	  reduces	  the	  freely	  available	  income	  for	  other	  consumption	  purposes.	  	  These	  two	  factors:	  new	  money	  input	  into	  the	  housing	  market	  and	  an	  increasing	  debt	  service	  for	  new	  house	  buyers	  both	  lead	  to	  a	  reduction	  in	  economic	  growth	  rates.	  	  
	  
Money	  input	  into	  the	  U.S.	  Federal	  Government	  and	  economic	  output	  
	  In	   table	  4	   the	   economic	   impact	   on	  GDP	   is	  measured	   from	  Federal	   government	  borrowings	  for	  the	  period	  1997-­‐2013.	  	  
Table	  4:	  U.S.	  Federal	  government	  borrowings	  for	  the	  period	  1997-­‐20134	  
	  Year	   U.S	  Federal	  Government	  borrowings	  x	  U.S.billion	  
Percentage	  of	  GDP	  %	   Year	   U.S.	  Federal	  Government	  Borrowings	  x	  U.S.billion	  	  
Percentage	  of	  GDP	  %	  1997	   	  	  	  	  	  21.89	   +0.25	   2006	   	  	  	  248.18	   +1.79	  1998	   	  	  -­‐	  	  69.27	  	   -­‐	  0.76	   2007	   	  	  	  160.71	   +1.11	  1999	   	  	  -­‐	  125.61	   -­‐	  1.30	   2008	   	  	  	  458.55	   +3.12	  2000	   	  	  -­‐	  236.24	   -­‐	  2.23	   2009	   	  	  1412.69	   +9.80	  2001	   	  	  -­‐	  128.23	   -­‐	  1.21	   2010	   	  	  1294.37	   +8.65	  2002	   	  	  	  	  	  157.75	   +1.44	   2011	   	  	  1299.54	   +8.37	  2003	   	  	  	  	  	  377.59	   +3.28	   2012	   	  	  1086.97	   +6.69	  2004	   	  	  	  	  	  412.73	   +3.36	   2013	   	  	  	  	  679.50	   +4.05	  2005	   	  	  	  	  	  318.35	   +2.43	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  http://www.usgovernmentspending.com/download_multi_year_1997_2013USb_16s2li101mcn_H0t	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  The	   really	   remarkable	   changes	   in	   the	  U.S.	   government	  deficit	   funding	  over	   the	  period	  1997-­‐2013	  was	  not	  that	  there	  was	  a	  surplus	  from	  1998-­‐2001,	  or	  a	  deficit	  due	   to	  military	  efforts	   in	   the	  Middle	  East	   from	  2003,	  but	   the	  dramatic	   jump	   in	  deficit	  funding	  from	  2009	  onwards.	  	  	  The	   total	   level	   of	   revenues	   for	   the	   U.S.	   Federal,	   States	   and	   local	   governments	  were	  $5.170	  trillion	  in	  fiscal	  year	  2007.	  This	  level	  of	  revenues	  dropped	  to	  $4.667	  trillion	  in	  2008	  and	  a	  further	  drop	  to	  $3.665	  trillion	  in	  2009.	  No	  government	  can	  lower	   its	   expenditure	   level	   by	   just	   over	   $1.5	   trillion	  or	  29%	   in	   just	   two	  years;	  neither	  should	  it	  attempt	  to	  do	  so	  in	  the	  short	  run.	  	  U.S.	  government	  expenses,	  including	  those	  funded	  by	  borrowed	  funds,	  lose	  their	  contribution	   to	   economic	   growth	   in	   the	   year	   after	   the	   expenditure	   has	   taken	  place.	   However	   the	   impact	   of	   borrowed	   funds	   will	   set	   back	   the	   disposable	  income	  growth	  for	  individual	  households	  for	  many	  years	  in	  the	  future.	  Hence	  the	  need	  for	  balanced	  budgets	  or	  for	  other	  solutions	  which	  help	  to	  get	  an	  economy	  back	  to	  its	  feet.	  	  The	   experience	   of	   the	   U.S.	   shows	   that	   as	   a	   consequence	   of	   the	   individual	  households’	   financial	   crisis	   brought	   about	   by	   years	   of	   neglect	   of	   the	   “money	  input	   -­‐	   new	   housing	   starts	   output	   relationship”	   U.S.	   government	   revenues	  dropped	   by	   29%	   over	   the	   period	   2007-­‐2009.	   The	   real	   issue	   was	   and	   is	   that	  government	  revenues	  can	  be	  regarded	  as	  a	  lagging	  indicator	  of	  economic	  health.	  The	   leading	   issue	   was	   and	   is	   the	   financial	   health	   situation	   of	   individual	  households.	  
	  
Outstanding	  student	  loans	  in	  the	  U.S.	  
	  According	   to	   data	   provided	   by	   the	   Federal	   Reserve	   on	   October	   7th	   2014,	  outstanding	   student	   loans	   have	   reached	   $1.3	   trillion	   with	   an	   average	   annual	  increment	   of	   about	   $100	   billion.	   Delinquencies	   (outstanding	   payments	   of	   90	  days	  and	  over)	  have	  already	  reached	  11.8%.	  	  This	  is	  just	  another	  example	  of	  how	  incomes	  of	  individual	  households	  are	  being	  reduced	   due	   to	   borrowed	   funds.	   Of	   course,	   the	   intention	   was	   and	   is	   that	  university	   graduates	   earn	   a	   higher	   income,	   so	   as	   to	   afford	   the	   repayment	  schedules.	   Such	   indebtedness	   however	  will	   reduce	   their	   purchasing	   power	   for	  homes	  and	  other	  goods	  and	  services.	  
	  
	  
2	  The	  choice	  between	  institutions	  and	  individual	  households	  
	  
2.1	  The	  adjustment	  process	  
	  The	  U.S.	   government,	   the	   Federal	  Reserve	  Bank	   and	   the	   individual	   households	  played	  the	  key	  roles	  in	  the	  adjustment	  process.	  Banks	  and	  the	  financial	  markets	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  were	   rescued	   and	   companies	   adjusted	   their	   operations	   in	   line	   with	   expected	  demand	  levels.	  	  
	  
2.1.1	  The	  adjustment	  process	  for	  individual	  households	  
	  Contrary	  to	  many	  opinions,	  the	  adjustment	  period	  for	  individual	  households	  did	  not	   start	   in	   2005	   or	   2006,	   but	   started	   already	   in	   1998.	   In	   1998	   41.5%	  more	  money	  was	  used	  for	  each	  new	  built	  home	  compared	  to	  1997	  (See	  Table	  1).	  Table	  2	   shows	   that	  41.3%	  more	  homes	  could	  have	  been	  built	   if	  median	  house	  prices	  would	   have	   moved	   in	   line	   with	   CPI	   inflation.	   The	   potential	   number	   of	   new	  homes,	   which	   could	   have	   been	   built	   in	   1998,	   would	   have	   been	   200,000	  more	  than	  required	  to	  meet	  annual	  long-­‐term	  demand	  of	  1.8	  million	  new	  homes.	  This	  process	  of	   overfunding	   the	  housing	  market	   led	   to	  undermining	   the	   capacity	   to	  repay	   outstanding	   mortgages	   and	   also	   led	   to	   lowering	   the	   economic	   growth	  potential.	  This	  overfunding	  and	  undermining	  process	  continued	  to	  2008.	  	  When	   mortgage	   payment	   obligations	   can	   no	   longer	   be	   maintained,	   individual	  households	  find	  themselves	   in	  the	  unenviable	  situation	  to	  face	  the	  lenders.	  The	  statistics	  indicate	  that	  from	  the	  total	  housing	  stock	  in	  the	  U.S.,	  43.4	  million	  homes	  are	   rented	   and	   individual	   households	   own	   79.5	   million	   homes.	   Of	   the	   79.5	  million	   homes	   owned,	   49.2	   million	   individual	   households	   have	   taken	   out	   a	  mortgage.	   The	  most	   shocking	   statistic	   is	   that	   over	   the	   period	   2006-­‐2013	   22.1	  million	  households	   in	  the	  U.S.	  did	   face	   foreclosure	  proceedings5	  and	  5.8	  million	  homes	   were	   repossessed.	   The	   22.1	   million	   constituted	   more	   than	   one	   out	   of	  every	  6	  households	  in	  the	  U.S.	  The	  5.8	  million	  repossessed	  homes	  affected	  nearly	  one	  out	  of	  every	  8-­‐mortgage	  holder.	  	  All	   that	   one	   can	   conclude	   out	   of	   this	   overfunding	   process	   is	   just	   how	  economically	  inefficient	  such	  mortgage	  funds	  have	  been	  used	  with	  the	  very	  sad	  results	   of	   dramatically	   increased	   unemployment	   levels,	   a	   wage	   level	   growth	  below	   CPI	   inflation	   levels	   for	   a	   number	   of	   years	   since	   2008	   and	   a	   priority	  allocation	  of	  households	   incomes	  to	  repaying	  outstanding	  mortgage	  debt	  at	  the	  detriment	  of	  buying	  other	  consumer	  goods	  and	  services.	  Over	  and	  above	  all	  this,	  during	   this	   process	   over	   the	   last	   7	   years,	   5.8	  million	   households	   lost	   all	   their	  savings	  in	  their	  homes.	  	  On	  top	  of	  this	  all,	  individual	  households	  reduced	  their	  collective	  home	  mortgage	  outstanding	  amount	  by	  $1.2	  trillion	  from	  the	  end	  of	  2008	  to	  the	  end	  of	  the	  third	  quarter	   20146;	   this	   represents	   an	   11.4%	   drop	   in	   the	   level	   of	   outstanding	  mortgage	  amounts.	  	  As	   a	   consequence	   of	   this	   disastrous	   overfunding	   process	   and	   the	   subsequent	  efforts	  to	  get	  the	  outstanding	  amounts	  repaid,	  the	  U.S.	  government	  (Federal,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  http://www.statisticbrain.com/home-­‐foreclosure-­‐statistics/	  6	  http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/current/accessible/b100.htm	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  State	  and	  local	  governments)	  saw	  their	  revenues	  flow	  drop	  by	  $1.5	  trillion	  over	  the	   period	   2007-­‐2009.	   Over	   the	   period	   2009-­‐2013	   U.S.	   government	   debt	  increased	   by	   at	   least	   $3.5	   trillion	   more	   than	   could	   have	   been	   expected	   if	   the	  home	   funding	   crisis	   had	   not	   taken	   place.	   The	   economically	   inefficient	   use	   of	  funds	  for	  the	  home	  mortgage	  market	  led	  to	  a	  further	  inefficient	  use	  of	  funds	  for	  the	   individual	   households	   through	   the	   exacerbated	   deficit	   funding	   of	   the	   U.S.	  government.	  All	   in	  all	  the	  real	  victims	  of	  the	  inefficient	  home	  mortgage	  funding	  process	   were	   the	   individual	   households.	   They	   were	   the	   direct	   victims	   in	   lost	  income	   and	   spending	   opportunities,	   in	   reduced	   earnings,	   in	   increased	  unemployment	  levels	  and	  in	  an	  accelerated	  government	  debt	  level.	  	  	  
2.1.2	  The	  adjustment	  process	  for	  the	  U.S.	  government	  
	  The	   U.S.	   government,	   like	   all	   other	   governments,	   has	   an	   ambition	   as	   to	  which	  services	  to	  provide	  to	  the	  general	  public.	  Priorities	  are	  decided	  by	  the	  Houses	  of	  Congress	   in	   the	   U.S.	   or	   parliaments	   elsewhere.	   There	   is	   often	   a	   fierce	   debate	  about	  which	  type	  of	  services	  should	  be	  included	  and	  which	  should	  be	  left	  to	  the	  private	  sector.	  The	   followers	  of	   John	  Maynard	  Keynes	  were	  of	   the	  opinion	   that	  government	   budgets	   were	   the	   appropriate	   tool	   to	   stimulate	   employment	  creation	  by	  incurring	  additional	  government	  deficit	  funding.	  	  When	  outstanding	  government	  debt	  levels	  were	  around	  30%	  of	  GDP,	  this	  would	  have	  made	  sense.	  However	  current	  government	  debt	  levels	  of	  many	  countries	  in	  the	  world,	   including	  the	  U.S.,	  are	  at	  80%	  of	  GDP	  or	  over.	   In	   the	  case	  of	   the	  U.S.	  government	  debt	  level	  (Federal,	  State	  and	  local)	  it	  is	  forecasted	  to	  reach	  $21.845	  trillion	  for	  fiscal	  year	  2015,	  well	  above	  the	  U.S.	  GDP	  level.	  	  Tables	   1-­‐4	   showed	   that	   the	   main	   increase	   in	   government	   deficit	   funding	  occurred	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  overfunding	  of	  the	  U.S.	  housing	  market	  and	  the	  subsequent	   efforts	   to	   claim	   back	   those	   funds	   from	   individual	   households.	   The	  U.S.	  government	  saw	  its	  revenues	  drop	  by	  29%	  over	  the	  period	  2007-­‐2009.	  The	  deficit	   funding	   maintained	   government	   programs,	   but	   did	   and	   could	   not	   help	  individual	  households	   to	  get	  out	  of	   their	  debt	  position.	  A	  Keynesian	  solution	  of	  additional	  government	  debt	   creation	  on	   top	  of	   this	  would	  have	   incurred	  major	  economic	  risks.	  
	  
2.1.3	  The	  adjustment	  process	  chosen	  by	  the	  Federal	  Reserve	  
	  
The Federal Reserve's response to the financial crisis and actions to foster maximum 
employment and price stability according to its own description.7 
 “The	  Federal	  Reserve	  responded	  aggressively	  to	  the	  financial	  crisis	  that	  emerged	  in	  the	  summer	  of	  2007.	  The	  reduction	  in	  the	  target	  federal	  funds	  rate	  from	  5-­‐1/4	  percent	  to	  effectively	  zero	  was	  an	  extraordinarily	  rapid	  easing	  in	  the	  stance	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/bst_crisisresponse.htm	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  monetary	   policy.	   In	   addition,	   the	   Federal	   Reserve	   implemented	   a	   number	   of	  programs	   designed	   to	   support	   the	   liquidity	   of	   financial	   institutions	   and	   foster	  improved	   conditions	   in	   financial	   markets.	   These	   programs	   led	   to	   significant	  changes	  to	  the	  Federal	  Reserve's	  balance	  sheet.	  	  While	   many	   of	   the	   crisis-­‐related	   programs	   have	   expired	   or	   been	   closed,	   the	  Federal	   Reserve	   continues	   to	   take	   actions	   to	   fulfill	   its	   statutory	   objectives	   for	  monetary	  policy:	  maximum	  employment	   and	  price	   stability.	  Over	   recent	   years,	  many	   of	   these	   actions	   have	   involved	   substantial	   purchases	   of	   longer-­‐term	  securities	   aimed	   at	   putting	   downward	   pressure	   on	   longer-­‐term	   interest	   rates	  and	  easing	  overall	  financial	  conditions.	  	  The	  tools	  described	  in	  this	  section	  can	  be	  divided	  into	  three	  groups.	  The	  first	  set	  of	  tools,	  which	  are	  closely	  tied	  to	  the	  central	  bank's	  traditional	  role	  as	  the	  lender	  of	   last	   resort,	   involve	   the	   provision	   of	   short-­‐term	   liquidity	   to	   banks	   and	   other	  depository	  institutions	  and	  other	  financial	   institutions.	  The	  traditional	  discount	  window,	  Term	  Auction	  Facility	  (TAF),	  Primary	  Dealer	  Credit	  Facility	  (PDCF),	  and	  Term	   Securities	   Lending	   Facility	   (TSLF)	   fall	   into	   this	   category.	   Because	   bank-­‐funding	  markets	  are	  global	  in	  scope,	  the	  Federal	  Reserve	  also	  approved	  bilateral	  currency	   swap	   agreements	   with	   several	   foreign	   central	   banks.	   The	   swap	  arrangements	  assist	   these	  central	  banks	   in	   their	  provision	  of	  dollar	   liquidity	   to	  banks	  in	  their	  jurisdictions.	  	  A	  second	  set	  of	  tools	  involves	  the	  provision	  of	  liquidity	  directly	  to	  borrowers	  and	  investors	  in	  key	  credit	  markets.	  The	  Commercial	  Paper	  Funding	  Facility	  (CPFF),	  Asset-­‐Backed	   Commercial	   Paper	  Money	  Market	  Mutual	   Fund	   Liquidity	   Facility	  (AMLF),	  Money	  Market	  Investor	  Funding	  Facility	  (MMIFF),	  and	  the	  Term	  Asset-­‐Backed	  Securities	  Loan	  Facility	  (TALF)	  fall	  into	  this	  category.	  	  As	  a	  third	  set	  of	  instruments,	  the	  Federal	  Reserve	  expanded	  its	  traditional	  tool	  of	  open	   market	   operations	   to	   support	   the	   functioning	   of	   credit	   markets,	   put	  downward	   pressure	   on	   longer-­‐term	   interest	   rates,	   and	   help	   to	   make	   broader	  financial	   conditions	  more	  accommodative	   through	   the	  purchase	  of	   longer-­‐term	  securities	  for	  the	  Federal	  Reserve's	  portfolio.	  For	  example,	  starting	  in	  September	  2012,	   the	   FOMC	   decided	   to	   increase	   policy	   accommodation	   by	   purchasing	  agency-­‐guaranteed	  mortgage-­‐backed	  securities	  (MBS)	  at	  a	  pace	  of	  $40	  billion	  per	  month	  in	  order	  to	  support	  a	  stronger	  economic	  recovery	  and	  to	  help	  ensure	  that	  inflation,	   over	   time,	   is	   at	   the	   rate	   most	   consistent	   with	   its	   dual	   mandate.	   In	  addition,	  starting	  in	  January	  2013,	  the	  Federal	  Reserve	  began	  purchasing	  longer-­‐term	  Treasury	  securities	  at	  a	  pace	  of	  $45	  billion	  per	  month.	  In	  December	  2013,	  the	  FOMC	  announced	  a	  modest	  reduction	  in	  the	  monthly	  pace	  of	  asset	  purchases	  and	   indicated	   it	   would	   likely	   reduce	   the	   pace	   of	   asset	   purchases	   in	   further	  measured	   steps	   at	   future	   meetings	   if	   incoming	   data	   pointed	   to	   continued	  improvement	   in	   labor	  market	  conditions	  and	   inflation	  moving	  back	  toward	  the	  Committee’s	  2	  percent	  longer-­‐run	  objective.”	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  above	  was	  a	  direct	  quotation	  of	  the	  Fed’s	  response	  to	  the	  financial	  crisis	  of	  2007.	  	  Some	  observations	  can	  be	  made	  about	  the	  Fed’s	  response.	  	  1.	   The	   first	   one	   is	   about	   the	   start	   of	   the	   crisis.	   As	   table	   1	   shows	   the	   crisis	   of	  overfunding	  the	  mortgage	  market	  started	  in	  1998	  and	  not	  in	  2007.	  In	  2007	  one	  could	  observe	   the	  collapse	  of	   the	  home	  mortgage	  debt	  mountain	  built	  up	  since	  1998.	  	  2.	  House	  price	  inflation,	  which	  affects	  all	  newcomers	  to	  the	  housing	  market,	  was	  not	   regarded	   as	   relevant	   to	   the	   inflation	   objective	   of	   2%.	   	   Forcing	   individual	  households	   to	   spend	   a	   higher	   and	   higher	   percentage	   of	   their	   incomes	   on	  servicing	  mortgage	  debt	  has	  had	  a	  detrimental	  effect	  on	  overall	  economic	  growth	  levels.	  	  3.	   New	   housing	   starts	   do	   not	   reflect	   general	   supply	   and	   demand	   theories,	   as	  demand	  is	  a	  finite	  rather	  than	  an	  unlimited	  one.	  The	  U.S.	  needs	  about	  1.8	  million	  new	   housing	   starts	   a	   year.	   In	   1998	   the	   increase	   in	   outstanding	   mortgage	  amounts	  would	  already	  have	  made	  it	  possible,	   if	  house	  prices	  had	  moved	  up	  in	  line	   with	   CPI	   inflation	   levels,	   to	   build	   200,000	   homes	   more	   than	   needed.	  Overfunding,	   rather	   than	   underfunding,	   was	   the	   main	   cause	   of	   the	   financial	  crisis,	  which	  started	  in	  1998.	  Over	  the	  years’	  1998-­‐2007	  increasing	  money	  flows	  into	   the	   housing	   market	   created	   less	   and	   less	   economic	   growth.	   The	   Money	  Efficiency	  Index	  showed	  the	  extent	  of	  the	  inefficiencies.	  	  4.	   Banks	   competing	   for	   customers	   in	   making	   funds	   available	   to	   the	   home	  mortgage	   markets	   do	   not	   take	   into	   account	   the	   macro-­‐economic	   effects	   of	  overfunding	   a	   housing	  market	   with	   a	   finite	   need	   for	   new	   homes.	   Competition	  among	  banks	  does	  not	  lead	  to	  limits	  on	  the	  volume	  of	  funds	  lend.	  	  5.	  The	  response	  to	  the	  aggressive	  lowering	  of	  the	  Fed	  funds	  rate	  from	  5	  -­‐1/4	  %	  to	  practically	  zero	  did	  not	  entice	  existing	  mortgage	  holders	   to	  borrow	  more	  or	  new	   entrants	   to	   enter	   the	   mortgage	   markets;	   rather	   the	   opposite.	   From	   the	  outstanding	  home	  mortgages	  level	  of	  $10.5	  trillion	  as	  per	  the	  end	  of	  2008,	  $1.2	  trillion	  was	  repaid	  on	  a	  net	  basis	  between	  2008	  and	  the	   third	  quarter	  of	  2014.	  Individual	   households	   saved	   more	   out	   of	   their	   incomes	   to	   repay	   mortgages,	  thereby	  reducing	  economic	  growth	  levels.	  	  6.	  The	  one	  group	  most	  affected	  by	  the	  overfunding	  process	  were	  the	  individual	  households	   in	   the	  U.S.	  Of	   course	   some	  of	   the	   lending	   institutions	   and	   financial	  market	   participants	   would	   have	   gone	   bankrupt	   if	   no	   liquidity	   and	   financial	  market	  support	  would	  have	  been	  given.	  This	  would	  have	  been	  catastrophic	   for	  the	  U.S.	   as	  well	   as	   for	  other	   countries.	  However	  one	   should	  not	   forget	   that	   the	  banks	  were	   the	  ones	  responsible	   for	  all	   the	   lending	  decisions	   in	   the	   first	  place.	  No	  borrower	  can	  borrow	  unless	  the	  lender	  decides	  so.	  It	  is	  in	  this	  respect	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  regretful	   that	   the	   option	   to	   help	   individual	   households	   directly	   was	   not	  considered.	   If	   households	   had	   been	   helped	   in	   their	   liquidity	   position	   from	   as	  early	   as	   from	   2008,	   the	   adjustment	   period	   would	   have	   been	   substantially	  shortened	   and	   economic	   growth	   rates	   would	   not	   have	   been	   dropped	   so	  drastically.	   The	   U.S.	   government	   would	   not	   have	   seen	   its	   revenues	   drop	   so	  severely.	  How	   the	  Economic	  Growth	   Incentive	  Method	   could	  have	  worked	   and	  still	  can	  work	  for	  European	  countries	  will	  be	  set	  out	  in	  the	  next	  section.	  	  	  	  
3.	  The	  Economic	  Growth	  Incentive	  Method	  (EGIM)	  	  The	  readjustment	  period	  for	  the	  U.S.	  economy	  has	  taken	  well	  over	  6	  years	  from	  the	  start	  of	  2008.	  As	  a	  result	  of	  the	  home	  mortgage	  market	  crisis	  in	  the	  run	  up	  to	  2008,	   the	  whole	   economy	  was	   affected:	   companies,	   individual	   households	   and	  the	   Government’s	   finances.	   A	   finance-­‐induced	   crisis	   needs	   a	   finance-­‐induced	  answer.	  	  The	  Federal	  Reserve	  did	  save	  the	  banks,	  apart	  from	  one.	  It	  did	  save	  the	  financial	  markets	  from	  collapse.	  It	  did	  lower	  short	  and	  long-­‐term	  interest	  rates	  and	  it	  did	  monetize	  $2.461	  trillion	  of	  government	  debt	  and	  $1.737	  trillion	  in	  mortgage	  debt	  as	  per	  its	  balance	  sheet	  of	  31	  December	  2014.8	  	  	  The	   real	   question	   is:	   Would	   it	   have	   been	   possible	   to	   shorten	   the	   adjustment	  period?	  	  The	   key	   consideration	   could	   have	   been	   to	   shift	   the	   attention	   away	   from	  institutional	   support	   –support	   of	   the	   banks	   and	   the	   financial	   system-­‐	   to	   some	  form	  of	  support	  of	  individual	  households.	  More	  of	  the	  latter	  would	  have	  reduced	  the	  need	  for	  the	  former.	  	  In	   2007	   the	   average	  median	   household	   income	  was	   $50,740.9.	   The	   number	   of	  individual	   households	  was	   116	   783	   000.10	  If	   in	   2008,	   the	   Federal	   Reserve	   had	  decided,	  with	  approval	  from	  the	  Houses	  of	  Congress,	  to	  advance	  tax	  free	  4%	  or	  $2030	   to	   every	   individual	   household,	   the	   total	   bill	   would	   have	   come	   to	   $237	  billion.	   If	   in	  2009	  3%	  had	  been	  advanced	   the	  bill	  would	  have	  been	  about	  $180	  billion	  and	  for	  2010	  2%	  with	  a	  bill	  of	  $130	  billion;	  in	  total	  $547	  billion.	  	  What	  would	  have	  happened	  is	  that	  for	  the	  lowest	  fifth	  income	  group	  this	  would	  have	  meant	  an	  income	  increase	  of	  11.47%	  over	  their	  average	  household	  income	  of	  $17,700.	  For	  the	  second	  fifth	  with	  an	  average	  income	  of	  $38,000	  it	  would	  have	  meant	  an	  income	  injection	  of	  5.34%.	  For	  the	  third	  fifth	  it	  meant	  an	  injection	  of	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  A	  Keynesian	  factor	  in	  monetary	  policy:	  the	  EGIM	  method©	  Drs	  Kees	  De	  Koning	  	  3.67%	   over	   their	   median	   income	   of	   $55,300;	   for	   the	   fourth	   fifth	   a	   2.61%	  injection	  and	  for	  the	  top	  fifth	  a	  1.02%	  injection.	  	  The	   2008	   cash	   injection	  would	   have	   implied	   a	   1.61%	  growth	   incentive,	   as	   the	  GDP	  for	  the	  year	  was	  $14.72	  trillion.	  However	  the	  consumption	  multiplier	  would	  likely	  have	  made	  the	  result	  more	  significant.	  	  The	  claim	  that	  the	  Federal	  Reserve	  would	  have	  had	  on	  its	  books	  would	  not	  be	  a	  claim	   on	   individual	   households,	   but	   on	   the	   whole	   economy,	   represented	   by	  future	   government	   revenues.	   Instead	   of	   spending	   a	   full	   $2.4	   trillion	   on	   past	  government	   debt	   through	   Quantitative	   Easing,	   about	   $240	   billion	   could	   have	  been	   spent	   on	   basis	   of	   future	   government	   cash-­‐in	   flows.	   In	   other	   words	   the	  Houses	   of	   Congress	   could	   have	   authorized	   that	   the	   Fed	   could	   reclaim	   the	  individual	   household	   cash	   injection	   from	   future	   government	   revenues	   over	   a	  period	  of	  say	  ten	  years.	  	  What	  is	  important	  in	  the	  EGIM	  method	  is	  that	  lower-­‐income	  families	  are	  helped	  much	   more	   percentage	   wise	   than	   the	   better	   off	   ones.	   This	   makes	   perfect	  economic	  sense,	  as	  the	  lower-­‐income	  families	  are	  the	  ones	  who	  generally	  suffer	  most	  from	  a	  recession	  period.	  	  Some	   of	   the	   cash	   provided	   to	   individual	   households	  would	   have	   been	   used	   to	  service	   outstanding	  mortgages.	   The	   result	   would	   have	   been	   fewer	   foreclosure	  proceedings	  and	   less	  home	  repossessions.	   It	  would	  also	  mean	   that	   the	  affected	  households	  would	  have	  more	   funds	   to	  spend	  on	  other	  goods	  and	  services.	  The	  households	   not	   affected	   by	  mortgage	   repayments	   would	   have	  more	  money	   to	  spend	  on	  goods	  and	  services.	  A	  campaign	  to	  encourage	  the	  population	  to	  use	  the	  funds	  for	  “economic	  stimulus”	  consumption	  should	  convince	  most	  households	  to	  follow	  suit.	  	  The	  above	  use	  of	  a	  4,	  3	  and	  2%	  was	  only	  to	  illustrate	  how	  an	  Economic	  Growth	  Incentive	  Method	  could	  work.	  If	  the	  EGIM	  system	  would	  be	  used,	  it	  is,	  of	  course,	  the	  prerogative	  of	   the	   legislature	   together	  with	   the	  Central	  bank	   to	   choose	   the	  appropriate	   level	   of	   cash	   advance	   for	   all	   individual	   households	   or	   for	   specific	  income	  categories.	  	  The	  United	  States	  have	  already	  gone	  through	  their	  adjustment	  period	  of	  6	  years	  since	  the	  start	  of	  2008.	  Europe	  and	  especially	  the	  Eurozone	  has	  not	  adjusted	  yet.	  The	   EGIM	  method	   is	   not	   only	   applicable	   to	   the	   U.S.	   for	   future	   use,	   but	   can	   be	  applied	  by	  the	  ECB	  for	  all	  Eurozone	  countries.	  One	  can	  describe	  the	  use	  of	  future	  Government	  cash	  revenues	  for	  current	  expenditure	  as	  a	  Keynesian	  application	  of	  monetary	  policy.	  	  Drs	  Kees	  De	  Koning	  Chorleywood,	  U.K.	  5th	  January	  2015	  E-­‐mail:	  keesdekoning008@hotmail.com	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